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December 2015 - January 2016

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Te Rūnanga-ā-Iwi o Ngāti Kahu

Land Claims Report for December 2015 – January 2016


1.                 Still awaiting Court of Appeal date for binding recommendations application

2.                Awaiting response from Minister of Treaty Negotiations on OTS and government officials still causing problems

3.                 Repossession of Kaitāia Airport in the District Court

4.                 Progress with publication of Deed of Partial Settlement

5.                 Ngāti Kahu Trust Board Litigation Against Ngāti Kahu Mortgage Services

6.                 National Iwi Chairs’ Forum – 4-5 February at Waitangi

7.                Claim to Waitangi Tribunal against government’s Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA)

8.                Moana Jackson’s report on Constitutional Transformation



·        We continue to wait for a hearing date from the Court of Appeal in respect of the Waitangi Tribunal not making binding recommendations.

·        The paper war with Minister of Treaty Negotiations Finlayson continues as we await his response to our latest response.

·        The hearing date for the six Patukōraha, Ngāi Tohianga and Te Paatu people arrested for trespassing on their own ancestral lands at Rangiāniwaniwa was postponed to 24 February in the Kaitāia District Court. It will be to review evidence only. Kaumātua Herewini Karaka’s pension has been cut off because he refuses to present himself to the Kaitāia police.

·        The finalised manuscript of our book Ngāti Kahu: Portrait of a Sovereign Nation, our Deed of Partial Settlement, has been delivered to Huia Publishers.

·        The Rūnanga is to appoint two interim trustees for Ngāti Kahu’s farm at Taipā.

·        National Iwi Chairs’ Forum is to be held at the Copthorne Hotel at Waitangi 4-5 February.

·        We joined the urgent application to the Waitangi Tribunal on the government’s refusal to consult over its TPPA. The hearing is scheduled for March after the signing scheduled for 4 February.

·        Moana Jackson has completed the report of the Constitutional Transformation Working Party. The executive summary is appended to this report. I will circulate the full report as soon as I have the final version.


1.  Awaiting Court of Appeal date for binding recommendations application

Before the Waitangi Tribunal can rehear our application for binding recommendations as ordered by the High Court, the Court of Appeal will hear and decide our appeal against the sections of the High Court decision that are in error. We are still waiting for the Court of Appeal to schedule a hearing. Our lawyers are also still pursuing costs from the government as directed by the High Court.


1.     Minister of Treaty Negotiations, OTS and government officials still causing problems

Apart from the Prime Minister reportedly making disparaging remarks about Professor Pat Hōhepa and me highlighting the gross injustice of the government’s treaty settlement process, the media campaign being conducted by Minister Finlayson against Ngāti Kahu appears to have fallen silent.  However the paper war continues. We once again provided him with proof that the Rūnanga holds the mandate to represent Ngāti Kahu.


In the same response we rejected his bald and false assertion that the senior OTS staff member has not been interfering and/or having other government servants interfere in Ngāti Kahu’s treaty claims. That behavior is continuing and in December OTS staff failed in their attempt to persuade one of our marae representatives to allow them to extinguish her and Ngāti Kahu’s claims.


2.     Repossession of Kaitāia Airport in the District Court

Patukōraha, Ngāi Tohianga and Te Paatu repossessed the Kaitāia Airport at Rangiāniwaniwa on 8 September to highlight the injustices against Ngāti Kahu being perpetrated in the legislation which extinguishes all the claims of Te Rarawa, Ngāi Takoto, Te Aupōuri and Ngāti Kurī. The NZ Police arrested six people, all but one of them kuia and kaumātua, and charged them with trespassing on their own land. The matter is before the Kaitāia District Court.


The hearing scheduled for December was postponed to 24 February. It is for a case review (a review of all the relevant facts in the case).


Kaumātua Herewini Karaka (Selwyn Clark) who is one of those arrested and has refused to voluntarily attend court has had his pension cut off for refusing to present himself to the police in Kaitāia. He does not recognize that they hold any authority in respect of him or his lands. A warrant for his arrest was issued but the police have not carried it out, instead telling him to present himself at the police station. He has told them to arrest him but they have not done so. Instead his pension has been cut. Herewini staged two protests outside the WINZ office in Kaitāia which attracted significant support.


4. Progress with Publication of the Deed of Partial Settlement – Ngāti Kahu: Portrait of a Sovereign Nation

The final text and drafts of all the maps and almost all the photos were sent to Huia publishers on 22 December. The publishers asked me to carry out any final work on the photos over the holiday break so that they can start preparing it all for publication early in 2016. Although the weather restricted the time available to do this, almost all were completed during that time.

Many thanks to the many people who patiently fielded and answered Anahera’s and my queries over the past few months. I’ve no doubt the publishers will have further queries as they prepare our book for publication.


5.    Ngāti Kahu Trust Board v Ngāti Kahu Mortgage Services Ltd

We need to finalise the appointment of two interim trustees from the marae who are mana whenua in the Taipā farm (Karepōri marae and Ko Te Āhua marae). Their sole responsibility is to make an application to the Māori Land Court to set up an Ahuwhenua trust over the farm. Once the trust is set up, each of the 15 marae will appoint one trustee each to the trust. The Rūnanga’s lawyers have completed the legal work required to make the application for an Ahuwhenua trust.


6.  National Iwi Chairs’ Forum – Waitangi 4-5 February

In December Archdeacon Timoti Flavell, Wīkātana Pōpata, Zarrah Pineaha, Anthony Housham and I attended the National Iwi Chairs’ Forum hosted by Ngāi Tahu at Arahura. My report of that meeting is in the minutes of our Rūnanga hui held on 5 December.


The February hui will be held in the Waitaha room of the Copthorne hotel at Waitangi on 4-5 February. Everyone is welcome to attend although only chairs of iwi can participate in discussions. Moana Jackson will present the report on Constitutional Transformation on 5 February.


7. Claim to Waitangi Tribunal against government’s Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA)

Ngāti Kahu registered as an interested party to the action taken by a number of people in the Waitangi Tribunal against the government’s refusal to consult over its TPPA negotiations. We are heavily reliant on the research conducted by Professor Jane Kelsey on this trade agreement and very concerned that adequate protection for our treaty rights have not been provided for. Hearings are scheduled for March even though the signing of the TPPA by the 12 states involved takes place on 4 February.


I have attached the paper that Professor Kelsey delivered at the National Iwi Chairs Forum at Arahura in December which explains the TPPA and the issues we are trying to deal with in respect of it.


8.  Moana Jackson’s report on Constitutional Transformation

Moana Jackson has completed the report of the Constitutional Transformation Working Party – Matike Mai Aotearoa. We were asked to provide a model for a constitution for this country based on tikanga, He Whakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni of 1835 and Te Tiriti o Waitangi. Essentially that came down to finding a model or models that allow Māori to exercise rangatiratanga, that is, to make decisions for Māori, and for the Crown to exercise kāwanatanga, that is, to govern its people, and for the two to come together as equals to make joint decisions where necessary.


The report provides six models each of which ensure that Māori make decisions for Māori (in the rangatiratanga sphere), that the Crown through its Parliament makes decisions for its people (in the kāwanatanga sphere) and that these two come together to make decisions on matters of mutual concern (in the relational sphere).  It also provides seven recommendations on how to progress constitutional transformation by aiming for a Māori Constitutional Convention in 2021, commencing discussions with the Crown in the same year for a Tiriti Convention and aiming for constitutional transformation to be implemented by 2040.


I have attached the executive summary to Moana’s report to this report. I will circulate the full report as soon as I have the final version.


Professor Margaret Mutu

18 January 2016




Briefing to the Iwi Chairs, 4 December 2015

Professor Jane Kelsey, University of Auckland

What is the TPPA

·     Negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) began formally in March 2010 were concluded in Atlanta, USA on 5 October 2015.

·     Notionally it builds on an earlier agreement between NZ, Singapore, Chile and Brunei, but it is really a totally different document.

·     The text was released on 5 November 2015, subject to legal verification (scrubbing).

·     There are 12 negotiating countries: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United States and Vietnam.

·     They are expected to sign the agreement on 4 February 2016 in New Zealand, which is the formal depositary for the TPPA.

·     Each party to the negotiations must complete its own constitutional processes and requirements before it can take steps to adopt the agreement.

·     The TPPA will come into force within two years if all original signatories notify that they have completed their domestic processes, or after 2 years and 3 months if at least six of them, including the US and Japan, have done so.


What is the goal of the TPPA?

The negotiations are designed to advance the commercial interests of the participating governments. However, there are already many FTAs among the TPPA countries. That means remaining border barriers are few and sensitive, especially for agriculture, and the outcomes will obviously reflect power asymmetries among negotiating countries. The TPPA explicitly aims to reach further ‘behind the border’ to impose disciplines on governments’ laws and policies than any previous agreement, which means it constrains domestic political and democratic processes and governments’ abilities to respond to unresolved matters or unforseen future challenges. The combination of rules on content and criteria for policies, state-state and investor-state enforcement, and committees to monitor implementation has the potential to have a chilling effect on future government decisions, including for the settlement of unresolved Maori claims.


What does the agreement cover?

The TPPA has 30 chapters and many annexes, with parties also adopting bilateral side-letters. Very few deal with traditional trade in goods. The most potent set down rules to promote and protect cross-border financial and other services, foreign investment, telecommunications, e-commerce, government procurement, SOEs, monopoly rights over intellectual property. Some, less binding, chapters address concerns like labour and environment, small and medium enterprises, development. Several process chapters, and parts of other chapters, specify criteria for decision making and rights of foreign states and commercial interests to engage in another country’s domestic decisions, and there is provision for enforcement by other states, and in relation to the investment chapter, by foreign investors. 


Why has there been such secrecy around the negotiations?

These negotiations signal a continued retreat by the government from hard won disclosure of the content of negotiations. The countries involved signed a pact saying no documents relating to the negotiations would be released during the negotiations or until four years after it comes into force (about 2 years after signing), aside from the final text. The main sources of information have been leaked texts and active monitoring on the margins of the negotiations by myself and a few others. The Crown refused to release any of the draft text to the Waitangi Tribunal prior to conclusion of the negotiations. Minister Groser’s refusal to release information under the Official Information Act was challenged successfully in the High Court, with applicants including Ngati Kahungunu, but the Minister is still stonewalling.


What role have Maori played in the negotiations?

None, despite the recommendations of the Waitangi Tribunal in WAI262 regarding Crown consultation on international treaties. In the 1990s and early 2000s Maori were very active in demanding input into such negotiations – hui were held over the intellectual property agreement (TRIPS) in the WTO, over the proposed multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) and early free trade agreements, such as with Singapore. TPK organised hui and consultation. The current Treaty of Waitangi exception (discussed below) was the government’s response to these concerns. However, there has been no outreach to Maori in the TPPA. Ngati Kahunungu was consulted early on about intellectual property and WAI 262 but that stopped. The only Maori on the MFAT stakeholder list was FOMA. A handful of others are listed as having been consulted, either because they attended the stakeholder sessions when negotiations were held in NZ (those sessions stopped 2 years ago) or sought out meetings. Recently MFAT held an ‘information session’ in Auckland for the Waitangi Tribunal claimants, where people had to enrol and some were refused entry.


Who had brought the Waitangi Tribunal claim?

The first claim was lodged on 23 June 2015: Wai 2522: lodged by Papaarangi Reid, Moana Jackson, Angeline Greensill, Hone Harawira, Rikirangi Gage and Moana Maniapoto, concerning the Crown’s actions and omissions in its negotiations over the TPPA; and Wai 2523: a claim by Natalie Kay Baker, Hone Tiatoa, Maia (Connie) Pitman, Ani Taniwha, Pouri Harris, Owen Kingi, Justyne Te Tana and Lorraine Norris, that alleges that without consultation with or consent from the hapū of Ngāpuhi, the Crown is ceding elements of NZ’s sovereignty before considering what effect this will have on hapū in light of the conclusions of the Wai 1040 Stage 1 Report He Whakaputanga me te Tiriti – The Declaration and The Treaty. Since then a number of other claimants have joined the proceedings.


What are the key arguments?

(i) the process has violated tino rangatiratanga, with the Crown failing to consult actively and engage in good faith with Maori during the negotiations.

(ii) the substance of the agreement will be inconsistent with, or would prevent the Crown addressing, matters arising from te Tiriti and the Declaration and from other international obligations, including UNDRIP. Examples cited were: unresolved matters arising from WAI-262; impacts of investor rights and investor-state dispute settlement on natural resources, notably mining and water; and rights to health through access to affordable medicines and the Smokefree 2025 strategy.


How did the Crown respond?

The Crown said that the Treaty of Waitangi exception provides full protection for Maori interests, although it refused to disclose the exact wording, just that it would follow previous examples. The Crown refused to allow an independent expert assessment of the exception in the week before the meeting as a matter of urgency before ministers were due to meet to conclude the deal, saying it was not prepared to reopen any agreed text as that would allow other countries to demand to do the same to New Zealand’s disadvantage – although it did then insert a new provision in the intellectual property chapter to address UPOV 1991, an example raised to support concerns about the implications for WAI262. The Crown refused to allow the Tribunal to see any of the draft text.


What does the Treaty of Waitangi exception cover?

Article 29.6: Treaty of Waitangi

1.     Provided that such measures are not used as a means of arbitrary or unjustified discrimination against persons of the other Parties or as a disguised restriction on trade in goods, trade in services and investment, nothing in this Agreement shall preclude the adoption by New Zealand of measures it deems necessary to accord more favourable treatment to Maori in respect of matters covered by this Agreement, including in fulfilment of its obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi.

2.  The Parties agree that the interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi, including as to the nature of the rights and obligations arising under it, shall not be subject to the dispute settlement provisions of this Agreement. Chapter 28 (Dispute Settlement) shall otherwise apply to this Article. A panel established under Article 28.7 (Establishment of a Panel) may be requested to determine only whether any measure referred to in paragraph 1 is inconsistent with a Party’s rights under this Agreement.


The exception applies to the entire agreement, but it has a number of serious limitations:

·     The government must be prepared to take an action that may breach the TPPA rules. As a rule, New Zealand governments will be unwilling to do so because they believe it encourages others to do the same in areas of importance to NZ.

·     The government must agree that something is a Maori or Tiriti obligation – seabed and foreshore and water show examples where it has refused to do so.

·     It must be prepared to act on that obligation, despite the potential to breach the TPPA rules.

·     If one government says it is not an obligation and refuses to act, and a future government changes its mind, that could be considered arbitrary discrimination, raising a problem with the first part of the exception.

·     Even if the government agrees it has a Treaty obligation and is prepared to act, the exception only applies where the government’s action involves discrimination in favour of Maori - not, for example, where demands for a general measure, such as a ban on fracking, are based on te Tiriti, or where Maori are predominantly affected by a measure, such as ETS. It was to address this inadequacy in the exception that the government got a last minute change inserted into the TPPA change to allow it not to sign up to UPOV 1991, but to do something different (although that has its own problems).

·     The government can also act give more favourable treatment to Maori where a Tiriti obligation is not involved, but similar issues arise.

·     While the government’s interpretation of the Treaty cannot be challenged in a dispute, a measure not based on te Tiriti (eg the UN DRIP) can be challenged.

·     The measure can still be challenged in a dispute brought by another party to the TPPA or an investor of a TPPA country (except Australia) for being arbitrary or unjustified discrimination. This wording is untested in this context, especially before an investment tribunal.

·     The measure can also be challenged for being a disguised way to benefit local providers of goods, services and investment. The threat of a dispute can have a ‘chilling’ effect of deterring a government from taking proposed action.


What is the status of the claim?

The Tribunal declined a request for an urgent hearing in December 2015, before the agreement is due to be signed on 4 February 2016. The hearing is set for 14-18 March 2016. It has been agreed the Tribunal will commission an expert in international trade and investment law and the Treaty of Waitangi to advise it regarding the Exception. Discussions are still underway over the scope of the hearing and the timetable, with the Crown seeking to push out the timeline for a report beyond the select committee process.


What are the potential benefits to Maori economic development?

After the negotiations were concluded, but before the text was published, the government made a number of claims regarding the economic gains to New Zealand, at the same time acknowledging it fell well short of the ‘gold standard’ it had set as a bottom line for an acceptable deal. There are two main figures, which the government claims will benefit Maori because of their significant presence in natural resource sectors of the economy:

(i) ‘tariff savings’ of $259 million when the agreement is fully implemented (around 2030); this is deceptive for several reasons, including tariff cuts do not put money in exporters’ pockets; tariff cuts may not be passed on to consumers; tariff cuts do not translate to new exports, but may divert trade from other countries; safeguard mechanisms and other protections may be invoked by the importing country; other factors, such as capacity and costs of increased production, may outweigh any new commercial gains.

(ii) gains of $2.7 billion to GDP by 2030. This figure is comprised largely of hypothetical gains from reducing non-tariff barriers, and is methodologically unsound – the government itself halved the original projection arbitrarily.

A critique of the economic arguments will be published shortly.

This rationale also ignores broader questions about how an economic model based on tariff cuts serves a future Maori economic development agenda that is built around relationships, values and environmental sustainability. Some rules, such as intellectual property rules on information technology, could also hinder innovative new ventures.


What happens next with the Agreement?

The Executive decides whether and when to sign and ratify the TPPA. Parliament’s role is largely token. Once the text is signed the government will table it with a National Interest Analysis (prepared by MFAT) in Parliament. It will be referred to the Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Committee to hear submissions, but the government controls the committee, and the government is not required to adopt any recommendations for change even if they were made. There is no requirement for Parliament to debate the agreement, let alone vote on it; that may depend on whether the government believes Labour will support it. The government must then introduce any legislative changes that are necessary to comply with the agreement. There are likely to only be a handful of amendments (tariffs, trade remedies, copyrights, investment vetting threshold) because the rules are mainly about locking in the status quo and pre-empting future decisions, or can be addressed by regulation or administrative means.


What can iwi chairs do at this late stage?

·        Require immediate Crown engagement and no signing of the TPPA until iwi chairs are satisfied.

·        Demand the government secures side letters from all parties that provides an absolutely protection for Maori and te Tiriti.

·        Support the Waitangi Tribunal claim.

·        Pressure all Maori MPs to actively oppose the agreement until these conditions are met.








Matike Mai Aotearoa, the Independent Working Group on Constitutional Transformation, was first promoted at a meeting of the Iwi Chairs’ Forum in 2010.


The Terms of Reference given to the Working Group were deliberately broad –

“To develop and implement a model for an inclusive Constitution for Aotearoa based on tikanga and kawa, He Whakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Niu Tireni of 1835, Te Tiriti o Waitangi of 1840, and other indigenous human rights instruments which enjoy a wide degree of international recognition”.


The Terms of Reference did not ask the Working Group to consider such questions as “How might the Treaty fit within the current Westminster constitutional system” but rather required it to seek advice on a different type of constitutionalism that is based upon He Whakaputanga and Te Tiriti. For that reason this Report uses the term “constitutional transformation” rather than “constitutional change”. 


A Forum Representative, Professor Margaret Mutu, was appointed the Working Group Chair and Moana Jackson was invited to be its Convenor. Members of the Working Group were nominated by Iwi and other organisations or were co-opted.

The Chairperson and Convenor facilitated 252 hui between 2012 and 2015. The rōpū rangatahi that was convened by Veronica Tawhai presented 70 wānanga.


The Working Group also invited written submissions, organised focus groups, and conducted one-on-one interviews. The views we received canvassed a number of topics such as the relationship between Te Tiriti and democracy, what is meant by a treaty relationship, what is a constitution, and other related issues such as –


-         The meaning of tikanga and its constitutional relevance.

-         The relationship between the Hapū referred to in Te Tiriti and the current Crown policy emphasis on Iwi.

-         The effects of increasing immigration on the Tiriti relationship.

-         The ongoing implications of the emigration of our people overseas.

-         How to engage with others to progress the kaupapa.

This Report synthesises those views and acknowledges both the complexity of the issues our people were asked to address and the insights which they brought to the whole kaupapa. It also recognises, as our people did, that there will be opposition to the ideas presented and that more work needs to be done. This Report should be read as part of an ongoing dialogue into the future. We stress however that it is not a new dialogue as the kaupapa of constitutional transformation has been part of Māori political debate for over 170 years.


The first issue which the Report considers is whether the Terms of Reference were in fact valid grounds for advocating and developing a process of constitutional transformation. In the view of the Working Group history clearly indicates that they are, and that prior to 1840 Iwi and Hapū were vibrant and functional constitutional entities. That is, they had the right, capacity and authority to make politically binding decisions for the well-being of their people and their lands.


The second issue covered in the Report is the historical and contemporary relevance, in constitutional terms, of tikanga, He Whakaputanga, Te Tiriti, and other indigenous instruments. On this matter our people were clear – they were fundamentally relevant because they all express the right for Māori to make decisions for Māori that is the very essence of tino rangatiratanga.


For that reason this Report does not consider in any great detail the contrary views that the Crown has maintained since 1840, and especially its presumption that Iwi and Hapū ceded sovereignty in Te Tiriti. We simply note that they have always been at odds with Māori understandings. Our Terms of Reference were based upon those understandings and we proceeded upon that basis.

The third task for the Working Group arose from the participants’ belief that a constitution had to be based on certain values. For example the equality provided for in Te Tiriti was itself seen as a value while others ranged from the importance of the land to a belief that a constitution should enhance the sense of belonging that Te Tiriti reaffirmed for Māori and offered to others. Others related to constitutional conventions such as transparency and mechanisms to ensure that the authority of Māori was not subordinated to that of the majority.


The predominance of the discussions about values indicated that in the view of participants a constitutional model (or models) can only be properly developed once there is clarity about the values it should be based upon. The Working Group accepts that view and notes that the Rangatahi Report which is attached is devoted entirely to suggested constitutional values – it was the major topic at all of their wānanga.

It is also our considered view that the identification of such values indicates a very real desire for a more open constitutionalism and what we describe as a conciliatory and consensual democracy rather than an adversarial and majoritarian one.


In the final Part of the Report the Working Group draws some conclusions and attempts to translate the kōrero about the nature, foundations and values of a constitution into a vision for constitutional transformation. It also describes six indicative constitutional models that have arisen from the kōrero.


We describe the suggested models as indicative because they indicate what models might best ensure the values involved in tikanga and the Tiriti relationship. We also call them indicative because they simply indicate the range of possibilities that are available for those who really want a good faith honouring of Te Tiriti.


It is hoped that the models might at least provide some options for the discussions which lie ahead. They would obviously need to be given detailed consideration, including the financial implications, before any final choice is made. The discussions may even produce an entirely different model.


The underlying kaupapa behind each model is that tikanga and our own history always recognised the independence of each Iwi and Hapū. The only restraint on that independence was the further and unique tikanga of interdependence – that is the belief that whakapapa ultimately bound everyone together and that any concept of constitutional and political authority was reflective of that. 


The other kaupapa underlying the suggested indicative models is that Te Tiriti envisaged the continuing exercise of rangatiratanga while granting a place for kāwanatanga. It provided for what the Waitangi Tribunal recently described as “different spheres of influence” which allowed for both the independent exercise of rangatiratanga and kāwanatanga and the expectation that there would also be an interdependent sphere where they might make joint decisions.


We call those spheres of influence the “rangatiratanga sphere,” where Māori make decisions for Māori and the “kāwanatanga sphere” where the Crown will make decisions for its people. The sphere where they will work together as equals we call the “relational sphere” because it is where the Tiriti relationship will operate. It is the sphere where a conciliatory and consensual democracy would be most needed.


The six indicative models are -

1.     A tricameral or three sphere model consisting of an Iwi/Hapū assembly (the rangatiratanga sphere), the Crown in Parliament (the kāwanatanga sphere) and a joint deliberative body (the relational sphere).


2.     A different three sphere model consisting of an assembly made up of Iwi, Hapū and other representation including Urban Māori Authorities (the rangatiratanga sphere), the Crown in Parliament (the kāwanatanga sphere),and a joint deliberative body (the relational sphere).


3.     A further three sphere model consisting of an Iwi/Hapū assembly (the rangatiratanga sphere), the Crown in Parliament (the kāwanatanga sphere), and regional assemblies made up of Iwi, Hapū and Crown representatives (the relational sphere).


4.     A multi-sphere model consisting of an assembly of Iwi/Hapū and other Māori representation (the rangatiratanga sphere), the Crown in Parliament (the kāwanatanga sphere), a constitutionally mandated set of direct Iwi/Hapū/Crown relationships (what may be termed the mana motuhake sphere), and a unitary assembly of Māori and the Crown (the relational sphere). 

5.     A unicameral or one sphere model consisting of Iwi/Hapū and the Crown making decisions together in a constitutionally mandated assembly. This model does not have rangatiratanga or kāwanatanga spheres. It only has the relational sphere.


6.     A Bicameral Model made up of an Iwi/Hapū assembly and the Crown in Parliament. This model has distinct rangatiratanga and kāwanatanga spheres but has no provision for a relational sphere.


Some similar models have been considered before of course but the kōrero we have has suggested substantial and substantive refinements.  Perhaps the most important of those is the jurisdictional positioning of the relational sphere and the overarching constitution itself upon values drawn from tikanga Māori while recognising the integrity and independence of both rangatiratanga and kāwanatanga in their respective spheres.


The Working Group recommends

1.     That during the next five years Iwi, Hapū, and other lead Māori organisations promote ongoing formal and informal discussions among Māori about the need for and possibilities of constitutional transformation.


2.     That such discussions also be included as an annual agenda item at national hui of lead Māori organisations such as the Waitangi hui of the Iwi Chairs’ Forum.


3.     That a Māori Constitutional Convention be called in 2021 to further the discussion and develop a comprehensive engagement strategy across the country.


4.     That at an appropriate time during the next five years a further Working Group be appointed to begin consideration of relevant structural and procedural issues as they pertain to Māori.


5.     That at an appropriate time during the next five years Iwi, Hapū, and lead Māori organisations initiate dialogue with other communities in their rohe about the need for and possibilities of constitutional transformation.


6.     That at an appropriate time during the next five years Iwi, Hapū, and lead Māori organisations initiate formal dialogue with the Crown and local authorities about the need for and possibilities of constitutional transformation.


7.     That in 2021 Iwi, Hapū, and lead Māori organisations initiate dialogue with the Crown to organise a Tiriti Convention to further discussions about the need for and possibilities of constitutional transformation.


We believe that 2040 would be a good year to set as a goal for some form of constitutional transformation. We accept that task will not be easy but what is available to both Māori and the Crown from the kōrero we have been privileged to hear is the very real generosity of spirit which our people continue to display. In spite of all that has happened there is still good will and a belief that the many obstacles to transformation can eventually be overcome and a new constitution established. It would be fair to say that throughout the last four years of discussion people did not see that as some pious hope but as a legitimate treaty expectation.